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Korea traditionally occupies an important place in Russia’s foreign policy directed at Asia. 
That was the case at the turn of the twentieth century and in the Soviet period. In the first 
years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia pursued a one-sided course oriented to the 
West; however, soon geopolitical and geo-economic realities obliged it to become active in 
Asia. This reorientation was tied both to global tendencies, above all the shift in the center 
of world politics and economics to the Asia-Pacific region, and to disappointment with the 
Western approach, characterized by a lack of understanding and hostility. These general 
tendencies were not slow to make an impact on Russia’s approach to the Korean Peninsula. 
A course was chosen to forge normal partnership relations with both Korean governments. 
This occurred against the background of rapidly improving relations with China. Thus, from 
the outset in the second half of the 1990s, there was a triangular element to Russia’s thinking 
on how to deal with the divided Korean Peninsula in the context of its Asian policies.
As Russia’s relations with China were rapidly improving and its relations with the United 
States were deteriorating in the first decade of the twenty-first century, North Korea was seen 
through the lens of a triangle within a quadrangle within a hexagon. The quadrangle was the 
prism of U.S. pursuit of unipolarity, which was approaching the North Korean nuclear crisis 
in a manner that stood in the way of a political solution, and kept the triangle of Russia, 
China, and North Korea from pursuing a compromise plan that would lead to successful, 
multi-stage agreements combining assurances of regime security, assistance in support of 
economic development and reform, and denuclearization as well as a peace treaty. The 
hexagon included South Korea, which could be cooperative with Russia because of shared 
economic interests in a corridor through North Korea, and Japan, which generally was seen 
as siding with the United States and having a major role only at a later stage of negotiations. 
Blaming the U.S. hardline policy no less than North Korean suspicions for stalling the 
negotiations, Russia rested its hopes primarily on its relations with North Korea and China.
Assessments of the triangle with China and North Korea posed a problem, given the general 
atmosphere of not officially criticizing either of these countries. While there are alternative 
viewpoints publicly expressed in Russia, the mainstream, including many with official or 
semi-official positions, is careful not to deviate much from this advisory. Two prevailing 
arguments followed: 1) North Korea is not interested in the possession of nuclear weapons 
except as a pressure tactic to achieve reasonable goals, primarily from the United States 
and its allies; and 2) China shares Russia’s thinking in the Six-Party Talks framework, and 
the two countries can work closely together for mutual benefit. The problem with these 
assumptions is that the DPRK’s behavior defied Russian expectations at various points 
as it more clearly supported development indicative of a desire to be a nuclear weapons 
state with supportive missile capacity, and Russians often suspected China of opposition to 
reunification of the peninsula and aspirations to put North Korea under its own domination. 
The two other states in Russia’s primary triangle were driving forces in the struggle over how 
to handle the nuclear crisis, while Russia was often relegated to a reactive role.
This chapter emphasizes the Russian side of the triangle. It argues that policy under President 
Vladimir Putin has been pragmatic, puts priority on the Korean Peninsula, and—since the 
breakdown in the Six-Party Talks—has been struggling to find balance that will achieve 
denuclearization as well as other objectives. This struggle is linked to Russia’s bilateral 
relations with both the DPRK and South Korea as well as to its challenges in coordination 
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with China. Much of the chapter concerns the relations of China with both the DPRK 
and South Korea and its handling of inter-Korean ties, as seen in Russia. In 2013-14 the 
increasing seriousness of the situation is prompting new assessments in Russia, which are 
discussed as well in the concluding section.
The Leadership Course of Vladimir Putin
The pragmatic foreign policy course under the leadership of Vladimir Putin is free of 
ideology, both communism and early Yeltsin Westernism, and is directed at forming 
around Russia an independent center of power, which foresees the establishment of normal 
partnership relations with all countries, above all Russia’s neighbors. This is necessary both 
for the development of economic relations, which are directed at strengthening the economic 
power of Russia, and at world recognition of Moscow as an important foreign policy player. 
From this point of view, Asian neighbors are doubly important, since apart from the usual 
significance, they make possible the diversification of Russian foreign policy activity, which 
previously had given too much weight to the West. Moreover, in the East its political and 
economic model meets with much more understanding than in the West. The same applies 
to the reception given to the shift in Russia’s outlook on North Korea, which was met with 
enthusiasm in China from the start of Putin’s presidency, but with U.S. concern.
The Korean Peninsula is important from several perspectives. First, Russia is interested in the 
security of its borders, consequently in the political stability of both Korean states. Any war 
or loss of control in developments on the peninsula, in consideration of the presence in North 
Korea of nuclear weapons, could easily directly affect the adjoining Russian territory, capable 
of causing casualties, an ecological catastrophe, a flood of refugees, and other dangerous 
consequences. As a neighbor of North Korea, China expresses these same concerns. Second, 
both Koreas are economic partners of Russia, with South Korea Russia’s third trading 
partner in Asia after China and Japan and an important investor in the Russian economy. 
Such cooperation plays an especially big role for the Russian Far East, the development of 
which is an important strategic issue for Moscow. It is significant too that ties with it serve 
as a useful balance for what many consider to be one-sided dependency on China. Trade 
with the DPRK is not large, but, after all, it is a neighboring country. Besides, realization 
of a whole range of large-scale trans-Korean projects are tied to its participation or, at least, 
consent. These two factors account for a third: Russian interest in a quick resolution of the 
nuclear problem of the DPRK. For this, it actively cooperates with all of the partners in the 
Six-Party Talks. Thus, for very pragmatic reasons, Russia is interested in peace and stability 
on the Korean Peninsula, through cooperation with both Korean governments.
Since the breakdown of the Six-Party Talks in 2008 there has often been tension on 
how to strike a balance between pressuring North Korea toward denuclearization and 
restarting the talks on terms that leave the path to denuclearization less clear. China has 
urged unconditional resumption of the talks, while the United States and South Korea 
have put conditions on any resumption, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explained, 
having grown “tired of buying the same horse twice.”1 Russia backs the Chinese position. 
It is more optimistic that progress can be made in this fashion, compared to U.S., South 
Korea, or Japanese officials. This results in triangular relations whereby Seoul encourages 
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Moscow to be more demanding on Pyongyang, while Beijing prefers to follow its own 
logic with a priority on preventing instability in North Korea. Moscow also worries about 
instability there, agreeing with Beijing.
Russia and the DPRK
Russian authorities well understand the character of the North Korean regime. Indeed, the 
majority of people who find themselves in power in Russia recall the USSR of the Brezhnev 
period, which reminds them of communist North Korea, albeit distinguished by a softer 
regime. At the same time, a debate is under way in Russia’s ruling elite about what policy is 
needed toward Pyongyang. Holding quite a strong position in this are the heirs to communist 
ideology and approaches of the Cold War era, who continue to view world processes as a 
battle with the United States on all fronts. In their opinion, any anti-American force, even 
more, a radical one such as the Pyongyang regime, is a valuable partner. Although such an 
approach is usually not articulated in official documents, supporters can influence concrete 
decisions. A second group concentrated around allies of former Acting Prime Minister 
Egor Gaidar, on the contrary, starts from its western ideology, viewing North Korea with 
extreme skepticism. However, decisions taken toward the peninsula, as a rule, are based 
on the pragmatic course described above. This breakdown into three approaches with one 
deemed pragmatic and the others seen as extreme is similar to the way Chinese describe their 
calculus, also suggesting that policies in the West are ideological and not pragmatic, while 
their approach is not extreme support for North Korea.
In Russia the starting point is that in the present circumstances the DPRK scarcely has 
any chance to escape from its deep economic crisis, which is increasingly of a systematic 
character. The ruling regime is incapable of reforming the economy of the country, fearing 
loss of control over the situation and, with it, loss of authority. At the same time, despite 
the depth of the crisis, spontaneous collapse of the regime in the near future is hardly 
possible. From all appearances, the young Kim Jong-un has succeeded in strengthening 
his authority. Moreover, China would hardly allow the collapse of the DPRK. It is deeply 
drawn into the problems of North Korea and concerned about them and will continue to 
do everything possible to keep future developments under control and satisfy China’s 
interests there and on the peninsula as a whole. Awareness of China’s stance informs 
Russia’s approach to the DPRK too.
Improved relations with Pyongyang were one expression of the overall evolution of Russian 
foreign policy to a less one-sided and more pragmatic course. Russia strives to sustain good 
neighbor relations with the DPRK, maintaining political dialogue through the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Over the past ten years the two sides have signed more than 40 inter-
governmental and inter-agency agreements. The 2000 treaty replaced that of 1961, removing 
the mutual defense requirement, formally ending the alliance and the role of a shared ideology 
in favor of the principles of international law. Trade is at an insignificant $100-150 million 
per year, reflecting North Korea’s difficulty in supplying traditional exports and delays in 
payment or absence of any payment for goods received.
These factors make it impossible to realize much-advertised triangular projects with South 
Korea—a gas pipeline, a railroad corridor, and electric transmission lines—, agreement to 
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which was reached in Kim Jong-il’s August 2011 visit to Russia. Yet, two projects have 
recently been realized: the September 2003 construction of a 54 km. railway segment 
connecting the ice-free Korean port of Rajin with the Russian border city of Khasan at a 
cost of 5.5 billion rubles; and modernization of the Rajin terminal at a cost of 3.5 billion 
rubles. A big step forward was the September 2012 signing of an agreement on North 
Korea’s $11 billion debt.
The DPRK’s missile and nuclear actions have had a negative influence on bilateral relations. 
Moscow has continuously stood for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, does not accept the 
DPRK’s nuclear status, and participates in international sanctions that were imposed by the 
Security Council. On December 2, 2013 a presidential order was signed on fulfilling Security 
Council resolution 2094, providing the legal basis for implementation of this response to 
the February 2013 nuclear test in violation of Security Council resolutions. It was tied to 
the need to stop the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs, but it did not touch the essential 
needs of the population of that country. Fulfilling its international responsibilities, Moscow 
did everything possible to soften Pyongyang’s reaction and not harm its economic interests. 
Testifying to this is the fact that the order was not written until almost a year after the Security 
Council resolution. Moreover, an official pronouncement for the media stressed that Russia’s 
sanctions do not extend to Russians who support ties with North Korean partners in finance, 
trade, and science and culture, areas not connected to nuclear and missile activities of the 
DPRK. It was mentioned also that in case Pyongyang met the demands on all of its missile 
and nuclear programs and returned to the non-proliferation treaty regime and subscribed 
to the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, the sanctions would be dropped, opening the 
possibility for development of trade, investment, and other international ties.2
Russia remains convinced that a resolution of the North Korean nuclear program must 
be found strictly through political-diplomatic means, through restoration of the Six-Party 
Talks. Moscow is interested in having in the DPRK a good, reliable, and predictable 
neighbor, to develop multi-sided relations with it built on the principles of international 
law, no interference in internal affairs, mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit. It seeks 
to prod the DPRK into rational policies, notably cooperation with the ROK. Precisely for 
this reason Moscow officially welcomed the reopening of the Kaeseong industrial complex 
in August 2013 and expressed the hope that on the basis of this experience constructive 
dialogue would ensue on other problems, thus reducing tension, strengthening security, and 
forging an atmosphere of trust and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula.3 At the same time, 
in relations with Pyongyang, Moscow often feels dissatisfied with attempts to deceive its 
partner and pursue objectives incompatible with recognized international norms, which at 
times are characteristic of DPRK policies.
Russia and South Korea
Political and economic relations between Moscow and Seoul are developing stably today. 
This is facilitated by mutual economic interests: South Korea’s in resources, and Russia’s 
in investment, but also from the geopolitical situation, complicated relations between Seoul 
and Tokyo and the strengthening of China. Periodically, the heads of government exchange 
visits. Trade and investment cooperation has grown markedly in recent years; however, as 
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before, Russian exports are mainly natural resources, and the ROK’s are finished goods. 
Change in the structure of Russian exports is proceeding very slowly, and this is not 
satisfactory to the Russian side. Investment cooperation is picking up in tempo, especially 
in the extraction of oil and gas but also in the assembly of automobiles. South Korean 
car companies annually supply more than 200,000 vehicles, including those assembled on 
Russian territory.
After Park Geun-hye took office, there have been two summits, one in the context of the 
G-20 in St. Petersburg in September and the other in Korea in November, when President 
Putin achieved agreement on an entire array of bilateral cooperation. The eight signed 
documents included: removing visa requirements, establishing cultural centers, forming an 
investment platform, cooperating in the establishment in Russia of a center for shipbuilding, 
and cooperating in the area of transportation. Trade has reached about $25 billion, cumulative 
investment in the Russian economy has hit $2.5 billion, although it is not increasing rapidly, 
and the summit joint declaration specified concrete measures for strengthening cooperation 
in technology too.
A lot of attention in the Park-Putin talks was given to the situation on the Korean Peninsula. 
Moscow and Seoul firmly declared the unacceptability of the DPRK acquiring rocket 
and nuclear capabilities. It was strongly underlined that North Korea cannot acquire the 
status of a nuclear weapons state. The two sides were united that the DPRK must fulfill its 
international obligations and promises to denuclearize as well as Security Council resolutions 
and Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. Moscow and Seoul declared their support for the 
resumption of this negotiating process for managing the nuclear problem on the Korean 
Peninsula. The memorandum of understanding signed during the summit called for steel 
giant POSCO, Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., and Korea Railroad Corp. to participate in the 
Rajin-Khasan development project.
Speaking at a press conference in January 2014, Park Geun-hye assessed the current level 
of South Korean-Russian relations. “In relations with Russia until now, there were various 
problems, she noted, answering a journalist’s question on designated events. However, in the 
course of two summits we have been able to resolve many problems and draw closer.”4 On 
January 1 an agreement on visa-free entry for a period of up to sixty days went into effect.
Russia’s Approach to the WMD Crisis 
and Korean Contingencies
Russia has always supported and will continue to support the non-nuclear status of the 
Korean Peninsula and the non-proliferation of WMD and the means to acquire them in this 
region. It actively works for and will continue to work for a political resolution of the nuclear 
crisis on the peninsula. It condemned both the rocket and nuclear ambitions of the DPRK, 
taking a principled stance on these questions, as in the rocket launch in June 2006 and the 
nuclear test in October of that year. Russia directly participated in preparing Security Council 
(rocket and nuclear) resolutions 1695 and 1718, which not only called on the DPRK to 
halt these programs, but also contained concrete measures for curbing its military potential, 
specified by means of political management of complex problems on the Korean Peninsula. 
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Pyongyang’s announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty came as a surprise. The official statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry issued on 
January 10, 2003 expressed deep concern.
The Russian approach to the crisis over North Korean WMD should be seen against the 
general background of Moscow’s vision of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and of 
the non-proliferation issue in general. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is extremely 
damaging for the world as a whole, and it is at odds with Russian national interests to a 
greater degree than the interests of other major powers. Russia is the only state in the world 
that has the possibility of conducting a retaliatory nuclear strike against the United States. 
In this respect, it is one of the two most powerful countries in the world. Thus, proliferation 
devalues its military power and, consequently, its influence in the world. For Washington, for 
instance, proliferation is not so critical, since it is first in other respects. In the case of Russia, 
this is the only factor that puts it on a level with the United States above other countries. As a 
permanent member of the Security Council, it is one of five (although important), but not one 
of two. In today’s circumstances, when all other indicators show Russia far behind not only 
the United States but many other countries, proliferation, especially near Russia’s borders, is 
not only dangerous, it undermines Russia’s influence in the world.
Russia has participated actively in the Six-Party Talks since 2003. In order to find an approach 
for resolving the nuclear problem on the peninsula, it actively cooperates with China. The 
two began right away to seek a peaceful resolution of the problem. In a joint communiqué 
of February 27, 2003, the foreign ministers of the two countries expressed deep concern 
over the situation on the peninsula.5 The Korean question was given a substantial place in 
the joint declaration during the visit of Hu Jintao on May 26-28, 2003.6 Subsequently, the 
two sides continued close cooperation and consultations on this issue. They jointly called 
for the continuation of the Six-Party Talks in periods when they had ceased and for peaceful 
resolution of the nuclear problem by diplomatic means. At present, several times a year Igor 
Morgulov and Wu Dawei discuss this matter.
Moscow has all sorts of reasons to feel deeply dissatisfied with Pyongyang’s actions on the 
nuclear issue, which, from Moscow’s point of view, undermine regional security, and create 
multiple problems. Russia and the DPRK, having restored cooperative relations at the end 
of the 20th century and signed a series of important political and legal documents, expressed 
their firm intention to make an active effort on behalf of security and stability around the 
world. If there is danger of aggression toward either of them or in a situation of a threat to 
peace and security or also in case of a need for consultations and joint action, Russia and 
the DPRK expressed readiness without delay to contact each other. This key position of the 
Pyongyang Declaration has actually been ignored by the North Korean side, which started 
on the path of escalating the rocket and nuclear crisis, leading to the anti-North Korean 
resolutions 1695 and 1718. Despite the fact that shortly afterwards there was success in 
reaching compromise agreements in the context of the Six-Party Talks, questions remain 
about Pyongyang’s observance of the obligations it took upon itself in these joint documents. 
From Russia’s point of view, it is necessary, above all, to verify North Korea’s nuclear sites. 
This requires restoring official relations between the DPRK and the IAEA and conducting 
inspections of the sites on the basis of existing norms and rules.
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For objectivity, it is necessary to acknowledge that the nuclear problem on the peninsula 
has been aroused not only by DPRK. There were also attempts by South Korea to develop 
its nuclear potential. In the 1970s the government of Park Chung-hee was on the verge of 
building an atomic bomb, and only the sharp U.S. reaction forced it to set aside this ambition, 
but it did not stop attempts to engage in related non-peaceful activities. It is known that in 
1982 and 2000 the ROK was conducting secret work on the enrichment of uranium, about 
which it had to “confess” and inform the IAEA. Although this fact did not lead to a wide-
ranging anti-South Korean reaction in the international community, it was a signal that the 
IAEA had to watch the nuclear activities of Seoul closely too. Experts consider it to have 
contemporary nuclear technology (about 20 nuclear reactors), putting it on the list of states 
(more than 30 in all) that the IAEA views as able to build nuclear weapons. In this light, 
Russia seeks an active role in pursuit of an all-around, diplomatic resolution of the Korean 
nuclear crisis, turning the peninsula into a zone free of WMD.
Starting from what has been said above, we can specify some characteristics of future Russian 
policies toward the Korean Peninsula. Russia will continue to try to develop equal relations 
with both Korean governments on the basis of principles of international law. It will avoid 
dilatory or hasty changes in policy. Considering the economic situation in the North and the 
unpredictability of the regime, Russia will accelerate development of economic cooperation 
with the South. It will exert itself on behalf of disarmament steps, including the withdrawal 
of armed forces by both sides from areas bordering the DMZ under strict international 
control. While developing mutually beneficial economic ties with the DPRK, it will strive to 
establish a mechanism for the inflow of South Korean investment into the Russian economy 
and take steps for the entrance of Russian business into the high-tech sectors of the South 
Korean economy, as it also pursues three-sided cooperation in rail transportation linking 
trans-Korean and Trans-Siberian lines and in other sectors.
Future Russian policy will depend heavily on the overall atmosphere in international relations 
and especially on relations with the United States. If relations with Washington develop, 
Moscow can take a more active position, e.g. in urging China to exert greater pressure on 
the DPRK. In case of deterioration in Russo-U.S. relations, Russia will stick to the prior 
line of weakening sanctions and verbal exhortations to the North Korean regime. A separate 
question is Russian behavior in case of sudden destabilization of the situation in the DPRK, 
connected to the death of the leader and a struggle for power. Here Moscow’s actions would 
be directed, above all, at reducing the danger of any military conflict, nuclear accident, or 
uncontrolled exodus of migrants onto its territory. In that situation, it would be ready to 
cooperate with other DPRK neighbors, above all, the PRC and South Korea, in search of 
some way to bring the situation under control.
China and the Korean Peninsula
In Beijing’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula we can distinguish both overlapping 
approaches to the DPRK and ROK and specific types of conduct toward each. The main 
difference in these approaches is that North Korea is an important military and political 
ally of the PRC in Asia, and South Korea belongs to an opposing camp as a strategic ally 
of the United States. This distinction, however, is somewhat neutralized by Beijing’s line of 
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a balanced policy to develop relations with both Koreas. Its approach, which has the most 
influence on Pyongyang, differs from Moscow’s approach. If in Russia only a minority of the 
elite sympathize with the North’s leadership and consider it necessary to maintain it in power, 
in China there are much more complex feelings about this. On the one hand, one finds great 
dissatisfaction with Pyongyang’s course in developing nuclear weapons, considering their 
proliferation and possession by such an unpredictable regime unacceptable. On the character 
of the regime there are also no special illusions. Chinese experts close to ruling circles openly 
call it “feudal,” “dictatorial,” “medieval,” etc. at international conferences. At the same time, 
across a wide spectrum of Chinese society, in ruling circles, and especially in the armed forces, 
there are powerful historical feelings about the North Korean “communist brothers.” Relations 
between the two regimes have a long history, colored by many patriotic myths. China saved 
the North Korean regime in 1953, sacrificing thousands of “volunteers,” whose exploits are 
remembered in monuments found in many Chinese cities. Still alive and having influence are 
people who were participants in the war with the South, and scattered across all of North China 
are memorials to the heroes of that war. For the leadership now to follow a course of complete 
isolation of North Korea would be to recognize the complete failure and thoughtlessness of its 
entire policy toward the peninsula, beginning with the formation of the PRC and that thousands 
of heroes of the Korean War died in vain. This is very hard psychologically and politically.
There is other geopolitical thinking in China, including those who regard the reunification of 
Korea as inevitable and interference in this process as mindless, citing the need to develop 
relations with the South and making the most of the unfolding situation. Yet, another point 
of view is also influential, supporting the opinion that a unified, strong, democratic Korea, 
in which the United States maintains considerable influence, does not correspond to China’s 
interests since it could become a serious competitor and unfavorably impact on the internal 
situation in the PRC.
In recent decades China has done a lot to prevent destabilization of the situation in North 
Korea, which encountered great difficulty (the death of Kim Il-sung; U.S., Japanese, South 
Korean, and other military, political, and economic pressure; international sanctions, the 
death of Kim Jong-il). The persistent economic crisis remains a serious destabilizing factor. 
The (songun or military first) line from 1995 is costly, in 2011 comprising about 20 percent 
of the GDP or $7.6 billion, and intensification of indoctrination with the ideas of “juche” has 
driven the country into a dead end. Attempts at quasi-reforms have failed. The ruling elite 
dares not go close to the edge of economic transformation, recognizing the danger that it 
would lose power.
The death of Kim Jong-il, a leader who had caused a lot of grief to his ally, was taken 
quietly in Beijing. The Chinese leadership on the surface reacted positively to Kim’s 
decision to make his young son Kim Jong-un the heir to his power, and even prior to his 
father’s death the son was invited to visit China. The change in party leadership after the 
18th Party Congress and later in government positions had little effect on Beijing’s support 
for a leader, who in conditions of international isolation had to listen to Beijing’s advice. 
Under the yoke of severe international sanctions, Pyongyang is widening its economic ties 
with the PRC, which provides substantial help in energy and foodstuffs. Trade rose from 
$3.5 to $5.6 billion from 2010 to 2011, when they signed a new agreement on economic and 
technological cooperation.
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Chinese business was planting the seeds of its presence in the North Korean economy. Joint 
management was established on two islands rented by China on the Yalu River and in the 
Rason trade zone, enclaves until recently run by Jang Song-taek. China invested about $400 
million in developing the zone at Rason, where more than 60 of its firms operated and to 
which a railway spur from Hunchun was being extended. It declared its readiness to supply 
to the DPRK credits of more than $10 billion for developing infrastructure and extracting 
coal, iron ore, and other mineral deposits. Realization of large projects is scarcely possible, 
given Security Council sanctions; however, in the opinion of experts, China intentionally 
“does not notice” Pyongyang’s violations of the sanctions regime, and it is not distinguished 
by its strict observance of the Security Council resolutions.
China provides substantial humanitarian assistance each year, and unlike the West, does not 
require monitoring its distribution. Military cooperation also is developing with the DPRK, 
closed from public purview with both sides limiting official announcements on contacts that 
occur under an agreement on military and technical cooperation. In light of sanctions, both 
sides prefer not to advertise their cooperation. The DPRK has a substantial debt of more than 
$5 billion, which it hopes will some day be forgiven.
The abrupt removal of Jang Song-taek from the political arena at the end of 2013 raised 
concern in China. On the one hand, even for the DPRK, it is extraordinary in recent years 
for one of the highest leaders to be executed, and it is evidence of political instability in a 
neighbor and ally. On the other, removal of a person with good ties to Beijing along with 
official charges that he was working on behalf of “another state” (clearly hinting at China) 
was a blow. At least Chinese were accustomed to working with him. Yet, official responses 
were restrained, characterizing the matter as “the DPRK’s internal affair” as hope was 
expressed “to see the DPRK maintain political stability and realize economic development 
and people there lead a happy life...We hope and believe that China-DPRK economic 
cooperation and trade will move ahead in a sound and steady manner,” added the foreign 
ministry spokesmen.7 Given the complex military and political situation on the peninsula 
and the dead end on the nuclear question, Beijing remains careful and vigilant.
Of late, economic ties have acquired more significance in Sino-North Korean relations. 
Overcoming many obstacles, Chinese business is extending its presence in the Rason 
economic zone, establishing more than 100 joint ventures with more than 150 Chinese 
companies working there. Chinese have rented on a long-term lease two wharves at the port 
of Rajin, and China has a triangular project with the ROK to build a railroad and highway 
across the entire span of the DPRK, intended to compete with Russia’s triangular project 
linking the railroad of the ROK and DPRK with Russia’s. Despite its dissatisfaction with the 
behavior of its strategic ally, China has no intention of altering its fundamental approach, as 
before regarding it as an important geopolitical factor in its opposition to the United States, 
whose policies, from China’s point of view are directed against the expansion of China’s 
influence on the Korean Peninsula and in all of Northeast Asia.
The international isolation into which the United States and its allies drive Pyongyang leave 
it with no other options besides drawing closer politically and economically to China. As an 
ally, China can help in overcoming an economic crisis, offering more massive assistance, but 
Beijing refrains from that as it strives to persuade Pyongyang to start on the path of reform. 
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“North Korean refugees” in China pose a serious problem, as seen in the recent transfer of 
more than 30 of them to the DPRK, complicating relations with Seoul, which demands that 
they be sent to South Korea. An agreement exists with the DPRK whereby each side returns 
to the other anyone who illegally crossed their border. This is an unwelcome problem, which 
China promises to solve on the basis of “domestic law and international rights, and in the 
spirit of humanism.”8 Any solution is likely to reflect China’s overall goals: to maintain the 
stability of the North Korean regime, to strengthen influence over its new leader, to prod him 
into economic reform to end the deep crisis, and not to allow dangerous exacerbation of the 
situation on the peninsula.
China and South Korea
China’s policy toward South Korea is well thought out, without leading to the rupture 
in relations that occurred with Soviet-South Korean normalization. On the whole, it has 
succeeded in maintaining balanced political relations with both sides, while boosting 
cooperation with Seoul to a massive scale, climbing to more than $250 billion in trade and 
securing 70 percent of the foreign investment by the ROK. The goal is $300 billion in trade in 
2015, as the two sides negotiate the conclusion of an FTA. The rise in economic cooperation 
is accompanied by cultural influence on both sides. China’s Korea policy is seen with rising 
concern by a certain part of South Korea’s ruling elite, fearing hegemonism. Seoul has not 
concealed its disappointment over China’s support for North Korea’s position on the sinking 
of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. In turn, Beijing reacts with growing 
concern to the intensified ROK-US military-political alliance aimed at the United States 
incorporating South Korea into a global anti-missile defense. It expressed dissatisfaction 
with their October 12 agreement on missiles, which gave Seoul the right to extend the range 
of its rockets from 300 to 800 km.
In the ROK the Koguryo issue drew a sharp reaction. Seoul called the PRC claim that this 
ancient state was part of China “historical terrorism,” and the public condemned as rewriting 
history China’s conception of Koguryo as its “regional vassal.” On the South Korean side, 
scholars “remember” Manchuria in this period belonging to the Korean state, while regarding, 
as do North Koreans, its territory as the “historical lands of Korea.” Recently a new thorn in 
bilateral relations is the underground Iedo (Suyan) rock (island), over which Beijing intends 
to extend its rights, listing it as an object for regular patrols by ship and plane. When China in 
late 2013 declared its air defense identification zone, Seoul officially protested and declared 
that it would not recognize the zone. In turn, Beijing is critical about Seoul’s plans to establish 
a research station in the Yellow Sea on reefs where the exclusive economic zones cross with 
implications for claims in future negotiations. One more complicating factor is illegal fishing 
in the ROK economic zone, as in 2011 when the Korean coast guard caught Chinese in the 
act and one of their officers was killed, resonating in anti-Chinese emotions. Subsequent 
negotiations to prevent a similar incident did not stop the ROK from strictly controlling 
such illegal fishing. Uneasiness also occurred over Beijing’s attempt to appropriate the song 
“Arirang” and other Korean cultural symbols and traditions.
Despite such disturbing elements, China in the foreseeable future will persist in its course 
of strengthening all-around ties with South Korea, striving to reduce the influence of the 
66   |   Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
United States and Japan and defend its interests on the southern part of the peninsula. 
China’s significance for South Korean foreign policy noticeably rose after Park Geun-
hye became president, as hopes persist for China’s help in resolving the nuclear crisis, 
reestablishing inter-Korean dialogue, and, in the final analysis, reunification. Park’s June 
2013 visit to Beijing confirmed her vision of relations. This summit showed the intention 
of both sides to improve strategic cooperation, but standing in the way of such cooperation 
is the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Beijing and Inter-Korean Relations
Officially, Beijing supports and does all it can for improving DPRK-ROK relations. They 
found hope in the “golden decade” of 1998-2008 when relations developed very well in 
many spheres when Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun were in office. Bilateral trade rose, 
large-scale economic projects were realized, humanitarian contacts were actively cultivated, 
and both sides entered into negotiations for reducing military tension on the peninsula. 
When Lee Myung-bak came to power at the head of the conservative political establishment 
relations were thrown back to a time of sharp military-political opposition, even to the 
threshold of military conflict in 2010. Thanks to the efforts of Russia and China the two 
Korean sides succeeded in averting this danger. Inter-Korean relations are now complex. 
In 2011 the ROK conducted more than 40 military maneuvers, some involving American 
forces. At the beginning of 2012 the two undertook new maneuvers in South Korea. All 
of this aroused Pyongyang, leading in March to an especially intense propaganda war as 
the two allies proceeded with operation Key Resolve. Many meetings and demonstrations 
organized in the DPRK called for the “start of a holy war against the traitorous regime of 
Lee Myung-bak.” North Korea continues insistently to seek a South Korean apology for not 
expressing condolences at the death of Kim Jong-il, making also the following demands:
1. Fulfill the agreements in the joint summit declarations of June 15, 2000 and 
October 4, 2007
2. Stop accusing the DPRK of participating in the sinking of the Cheonan and 
shelling of Yeonpyeong
3. Stop military maneuvers aimed against the DPRK
4. Begin practical work for the denuclearization of the peninsula
5. Stop the psychological warfare against the DPRK
6. Restore inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges
7. Accept North Korean proposals to replace the 1953 armistice with a new 
peace mechanism
8. Abrogate the 1948 national security law and other laws, “directed against the 
Korean nation and unification of the country”
Pyongyang refused attempts to launch dialogues with the Lee Myung-bak administration 
and hoped that in the April 2012 parliamentary elections and the December presidential 
elections forces would come to power with which it would succeed in restoring political 
dialogue and broadening economic ties—forces standing for resumption of the course of 
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inter-Korean cooperation of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, which had given birth to 
hopes in both North and South Korea for reunification. China supports the idea of peaceful 
unification of Korea through a gradual process, during which attention should concentrate 
on strengthening security and stability on the peninsula, finding a political resolution of the 
nuclear crisis, developing dialogue beginning in inter-Korean relations, and realizing various 
forms of cooperation and exchanges.
Verbally supporting the unity of Korea, Beijing, nonetheless, would never agree to the 
presence in a unified Korea of foreign military bases and troops. A remark by Kim Dae-jung 
during his presidency about that possibility was taken extremely negatively by the Chinese. 
Beijing also fears that further delay in resolving the nuclear problem will provoke a regional 
arms race, leading to the emergence in Northeast Asia of new nuclear powers (Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan). Chinese are actively pressing for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, 
taking various initiatives to reanimate the negotiating process (Wu Dawei’s three-stage plan 
calls for productive inter-Korean dialogue, then negotiations between the DPRK and the 
United States, and last, full-fledged Six-Party Talks).
Beijing condemned the DPRK nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, participating actively in the 
Security Council resolutions that imposed strict sanctions on it. Beijing put pressure on 
Kim Jong-il, introducing economic restrictions, succeeding in stopping the nuclear weapons 
program and fulfilling the Joint Statement of Sept. 19, 2005. Despite its general assurances 
about readiness to return to the Six-Party Talks without conditions, Pyongyang prefers to 
reach an agreement on the nuclear problem with the United States. China welcomed the 
February 2012 North Korea-U.S. agreement reached in Beijing for a moratorium on nuclear 
tests and long-distance rocket launches and to halt the enrichment of uranium and agree 
to IAEA inspections of nuclear objects. It also approved of the two agreeing to fulfill the 
obligations set forth by the Six-Party Talks in the Joint Statement. In mid-April Pyongyang’s 
declaration of its launch of a satellite in honor of the centenary of the birth Kim Il-sung 
drew a sharp negative reaction from the world community. While China did not support this 
action, it was put in an awkward position and called on Seoul “to preserve peace and show 
restraint.” Plans by Pyongyang to launch missiles were condemned in December as well, 
by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which appealed on December 3 for it to stop, and on the 
next day by China, which indicated that it has constantly recommended to Pyongyang not 
to arouse the world community with such launches, but its opinion has yet to be accepted. 
When the launch occurred on December 12, the response from Beijing was negative, but less 
severe than at the time of prior launches.
In February 2013 Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi “firmly” condemned the DPRK’s new nuclear 
test. Tension in bilateral relations led to some incidents of the seizure of Chinese fishing 
boats by the North Korean coast guard. A strange situation arose: repeatedly recommending 
that its ally observe the UN sanctions and repeatedly being rebuffed, China “loses face,” but 
it does not adopt more decisive measures. Why? It is not a matter of not being in a position 
to exert effective pressure, since 90 percent of the DPRK energy and 40-45 percent of DPRK 
foodstuffs depend on China. Rather, China has not decided and is hardly likely to decide 
on such sanctions. On the one hand, it is dissatisfied that Pyongyang creates problems for 
countries in the region and the whole world. Therefore, China joins in UN sanctions and 
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often expresses its dissatisfaction with the DPRK’s actions. On the other hand, we should not 
forget that the DPRK is the only official ally of the PRC, sealed in a treaty of 1961 obliging 
each side to respond quickly with military and all other possible means of assistance in the 
event of an armed attack on the other. This is the only treaty of mutual defense that China 
has with another country.
A refusal to support the DPRK would signify recognition that the heroes of the war, whose 
example is taught to schoolchildren, fell in vain. Moreover, for Chinese communists it would 
be equivalent to wiping away the country’s entire foreign policy practically from the formation 
of the PRC, dealing a serious blow to the PRC’s legitimacy. No less important are geopolitical 
considerations. A majority of official Chinese analysts consider that the main problem with the 
foreign policy of the country is U.S. attempts to contain its development, for which it organizes 
along China’s entire perimeter a military-political encirclement. In this situation, even a 
sometimes disobedient, allied DPRK is a useful geopolitical resource. Excessive pressure on 
it could lead to its economic collapse, bringing a flood of refugees, political instability, etc. 
Moreover, unification of the two Koreas, which could result from such a collapse, would allow 
American influence to grow stronger in a new, more powerful state.
For these reasons Beijing strives to apply moderate pressure on Pyongyang, nudging it to 
a more rational foreign policy and more decisive internal reforms; however, this course 
scarcely leads to real results. Any serious market reforms would result in more openness, 
which would lead the people to understand the real situation in the country, bringing about 
the regime’s collapse and reunification. Therefore, Pyongyang is hardly likely to take that 
path, preferring to continue with a policy of trading threats for assistance.
However the problem of rockets and nuclear weapons unfolds, in our opinion, in the DPRK 
there is still a chance for managing the situation politically. Beijing continues to support the 
DPRK, which is an important strategic bastion in its battle with the United States for influence 
in Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula. In China it is well understood that if there 
is not out of the ordinary, uncontrolled collapse of the regime, any resolution of the Korean 
problem, due to its complexity, will require more than one decade. To achieve a comprehensive 
solution, which assumes above all political resolution of the nuclear crisis, conclusion of a peace 
treaty in place of the armistice, establishment of constructive relations between the two states 
on the peninsula, creation of conditions for peaceful coexistence of the DPRK and ROK—all 
of this is possible under conditions of maintaining the status quo. China’s Korean policy is 
based precisely on this, and will be based in the foreseeable future. Chinese are convinced that 
normalization of inter-Korean relations and a long period of peaceful coexistence can open the 
way for a gradual advance to unification of the Korean Peninsula.
Conclusion
The approach of Russia and China to the problems of the Korean Peninsula will be determined, 
even in the long term, by triangular relations with Moscow and Beijing. These very relations 
are quite strong both due to mutual economic dependence and, to a great degree, to geopolitical 
reasons. The general state of international relations, especially the rise in tension in Europe, 
contributes to Moscow and Beijing drawing closer and their joint inclination to contain 
attempts at world domination by the United States and the West. In connection with this, in the 
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context of quadrangular relations of Russia-China-DPRK-USA, the tendency is increasing to 
counteract the attempts by the United States and its allies to liquidate or weaken the North 
Korean regime with the possibility of more intensive support for the DPRK. Although the 
DPRK is unpredictable, it is an ally in the overall geopolitical struggle.
The first signs of the softening of the position of Russia regarding the DPRK’s military 
adventurism already are present. The Russian Foreign Ministry did not condemn Pyongyang 
for its launch of a medium-range rocket of the Nodong class in March 2014. The Information 
Department only called for “all interested sides to use restraint from actions that could lead 
to aggravation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.”9 Later in March, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Russia actually laid the blame for the artillery exchange between the 
two Koreas on Seoul and its allies, accusing them of provoking the North by means of 
conducting large-scale military exercises.10
Without doubt, such a change of position was a direct result of the sharp reaction of the West 
to the reunification of Crimea with Russia. Moscow also in this way expressed its gratitude 
to Pyongyang for Pyongyang’s support for its position during the voting on the question of 
the legitimacy of the referendum in Crimea at the UN General Assembly, where the DPRK 
wound up being among only 11 countries that voted against the anti-Russian resolution. 
Seeking not to be isolated, Russia is striving to strengthen relations with critics of the West 
in other parts of the world.
It is hard to believe that such changes could proceed without consideration of the position 
of Russia’s strategic partner—the PRC. In contrast to the West, the reaction of Beijing to the 
hostility to Russia over Ukraine was taken, on the whole, as approval of Russia. China did 
not support the West in Ukraine since it sees the crisis as engineered by the West aiming at 
world domination. In countering this tendency, in China’s view, Russia is a valuable ally. A 
commentary by Xinhua news agency on March 7 entitled “The West’s Fiasco in Ukraine” 
was very sympathetic to Russia’s actions and critical of those of the West: “Russia 
may no longer be interested in competing for global preeminence with the West, but when 
it comes to cleaning up a mess the West created in the country’s backyard, Russian leaders 
once again proved their credibility and shrewdness in planning and executing effective 
counter moves.”11 In short, Beijing is happy that someone was brave and resolute enough to 
take effective measures against Western “hegemonism.” But it is also comfortable that this 
was not China, and the Ukrainian crisis would not worsen Sino-U.S. relations that China 
values. It would also divert U.S. attention from an alleged plot of encircling China and 
limiting its legitimately growing influence in East Asia. Therefore, Beijing rejected any kind 
of sanctions against Russia. Generally, China sees the current situation in Ukraine as a “mess” 
created by the West’s ineffective and greedy policy. The Xinhua commentary asserted, 
“For the rest of the world, once again, people see another great country torn apart because of 
a clumsy and selfish West that boasts too many lofty ideals but always comes up short of 
practical solutions.”12 By “mess” Beijing usually means a situation created by Western 
sponsored actions aimed at undermining stable (often authoritarian) regimes all over the 
world, which in Beijing’s opinion can effectively secure the country’s economic development 
and growing cooperation with China. This term was used to describe the Tiananmen crisis in 
1989, “color revolutions” in Arab states, etc. Beijing’s regime sees countering this tendency 
even far from China’s borders as a means of protecting itself since it understands that 
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the same tactics can be used by the West in China. From this point of view China would 
only welcome Russia’s growing will to counter Western expansion, and they both may be 
interested in having Pyongyang on their side.
The only thing China does not officially support is Russia’s decision to annex Crimea. That 
is why it chose to obtain during the voting at the Security Council. Here Beijing’s position 
will be similar to that on the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: generally 
supportive of Russia’s actions, but not approving of undermining the territorial integrity of 
existing states. China’s approach is determined by its own separatist problems in Taiwan, 
Tibet, and Xinjiang.
In the current situation the other sides of the hexagon (Japan and South Korea) will be 
seen by Moscow and Beijing as allies of the United States, and the approach to them will 
depend on what position they take. Tokyo and Seoul may not want to sacrifice important 
trade and economic ties with Russia and China on account of European problems distant 
from them, and will stick to moderate policies. However, in case of serious differences 
over the DPRK (e.g. the departure of Russia and China from the sanctions regime as a 
consequence of the growing general confrontation with the West), they will have to more 
firmly support their allies.
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